Layout randomization is a powerful, popular technique for software protection. We present it and study it in programming-language terms. More specifically, we consider layout randomization as part of an implementation for a high-level programming language; the implementation translates this language to a lower-level language in which memory addresses are numbers. We analyze this implementation, by relating low-level attacks against the implementation to contexts in the high-level programming language, and by establishing full abstraction results.
INTRODUCTION
Several techniques for protection are based on randomization (e.g., Druschel and Peterson [1992] , Yarvin et al. [1993] , Kc et al. [2003] , Forrest et al. [1997] , Bhatkar et al. [2005] , Bhatkar et al. [2003] , Barrantes et al. [2005] , Berger and Zorn [2006] , Novark et al. [2008] , Erlingsson [2007] , and Novark and Berger [2010] ). The randomization may concern the layout of data and code within an address space, data representations, or the underlying instruction set. In all cases, the randomization introduces artificial diversity that can serve for impeding attacks. In particular, layout randomization can thwart attacks that rely on knowledge of the location of particular data and functions (such as system libraries). In addition, randomization can obfuscate program logic, against reverse engineering.
Other techniques for protection address similar goals. For example, methods that ensure the integrity of control flow and data flow, statically or dynamically, can also regulate the use of system libraries (e.g., Morrisett et al. [1999] , Kiriansky et al. [2002] , Abadi et al. [2009] , and Erlingsson [2007] ). The static methods may be based on types or other static analyses. The dynamic methods often rely on reference monitors, whether implemented in hardware or software, at the boundaries of address spaces or inline. In addition to the diversity of their mechanisms, protection techniques vary in their goals and the underlying attack models. Some aim to offer precise, general guarantees, while others stop only some specific attack that can be easily modified to overcome the protection. They also vary in the difficulty of deploying them and in their costs. No single protection technique appears to be always superior to all others. In this article we focus on layout randomization because it is in widespread use [PaX Project 2004; Howard and Thomlinson 2007] , it has been subject to practical attacks (e.g., Anonymous [2002] , Shacham et al. [2004] , and Sotirov and Dowd [2008] ), and it has hardly been studied rigorously.
We present layout randomization as part of an implementation for a high-level programming language. The language that we consider includes higher-order functions and mutable variables that hold natural numbers, which we call locations. Some of the locations are designated as public while others are designated as private, with the intent that an attacker should not have direct access to the latter. For instance, consider a program that manipulates data that should remain secret or be protected from tampering, such as a value that indicates the authentication status of a communication channel (as in Chen et al. [2005, Section 4.4] ). The program may store this data in a private location; it may publish a function that internally uses the private location, and this function may be invoked by untrusted pieces of code. The implementation translates the high-level language to a lower-level language in which memory addresses are natural numbers; layout randomization consists in mapping the private locations to random addresses in data memory. If the data memory is large enough and the randomization good enough, then even an attacker with access to all of data memory (e.g., able to modify the contents of any particular memory address via a buffer overflow) cannot find the private locations efficiently with high probability. (Otherwise, the attacker may succeed, as demonstrated in actual exploits, e.g., Shacham et al. [2004] .) We derive that the security properties that hold against attackers that cannot access the private locations directly continue to hold in this implementation, in a probabilistic sense and against resource-bounded adversaries.
Thus, our work takes place in a programming-language setting, and it draws on a line of research on protection in programming languages, and more broadly on ideas and techniques from programming-language theory (e.g., Morris [1973] and Abadi [1998] ). These include the use of contexts for representing attackers, and of contextual equivalence and similar relations for expressing security properties. Remarkably, though, this line of research has said little on randomization; a notable exception is the work of Pucella and Schneider [2006] , which we describe further in Section 6. In addition, our probabilistic results are analogous to computational-soundness theorems in the analysis of security protocols (e.g., Abadi and Rogaway [2002] , ComonLundh and Cortier [2008] , and Backes et al. [2009] ). These theorems relate symbolic proofs of protocol security, in which keys and ciphertexts are formal expressions, to proofs in a computational model in which keys and ciphertexts are bitstrings subject to complexity-theoretic assumptions. Unlike security protocols, however, the systems that we consider neither include concurrency nor rely on cryptography, but they do include higher-order functions. Despite these important differences, we hope that our work will enrich the study of computational soundness, in particular by showing that some of its themes and methods are applicable beyond security protocols.
The next section (Section 2) discusses our results in more detail but still informally. Section 3 contains preliminary technical material. Sections 4 and 5 are the core of this article; they treat models in which errors are fatal and recoverable (but costly), respectively. Section 6 concludes. An electronic appendix contains proofs and additional technical material; it can be accessed in the ACM Digital Library.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Layout randomization can be applied in a variety of systems contexts. In some (in particular, in kernel mode), accesses to unmapped memory addresses may be fatal violations that result in immediate termination. In others (often in user mode), erroneous accesses may take place repeatedly without causing execution to abort; a program that performs an erroneous access may recognize that it has done so.
This distinction leads to two models for what happens when an attacker accesses an unused address in data memory (rather than an address that houses a private location). In one model, such accesses are fatal violations; in the other, such accesses are not fatal and can be detected.
In both cases, our main results concern translations between the high-level language with locations and a lower-level language with natural-number addresses. (In contrast, one could study layout randomization by focusing exclusively on low-level behavior, as in Berger and Zorn [2006, Section 6] .) In the high-level language, there is a distinct type of locations loc and, assuming that the expression M has this type, one can write expressions like ! loc M and M := loc M for reading from and storing into a location. In the low-level language, on the other hand, if M has type nat then one can write ! nat M and M := nat M for reading from and writing to a natural-number address, which may be obtained as the result of arbitrary numerical computations in M.
In order to study the security of these translations, we represent high-and low-level attackers as contexts. More precisely, for a program M of type σ , we take attackers to be expressions C of type σ → bool. The Boolean output is standard in programminglanguage theory, but technically we could as well use the type σ → nat, for example. Informally, we think of C as interacting with M and possibly trying to obtain information about the contents of private locations or to tamper with them. Attackers must not have direct access to the private locations, so we consider only public attackers C, which are those containing no occurrences of any private locations. (Public lowlevel attackers do have access to all of memory, nevertheless, but via natural-number addresses rather than via locations.)
This representation of the attacker as a context amounts to a threat model, which allows rich interactions between the program being protected and its attacker. Both theoretical work and practical attacks often employ more limited threat models, in which, for example, the attacker provides only one input or a small number of inputs. On the other hand, this representation excludes power-analysis attacks, timing-analysis attacks, and the like, as well as any attacks that subvert the underlying execution platform. Realistically, layout randomization may not withstand such attacks anyway.
In general, a low-level attacker could exploit the operations ! nat and := nat for crafting attacks that would be impossible in the high-level language. In an extreme case, when erroneous accesses are not fatal, an attacker could iterate over all addresses.
Nevertheless, we show that the attacks possible in the low-level language are no worse than those that are possible in the high-level language, in a probabilistic sense and, if erroneous accesses are not fatal, within some number of such memory accesses that serves as a bound on the complexity of the attacks. More precisely, we map each high-level program M to a low-level program M ↓ , and consider the behavior of M ↓ in an arbitrary low-level context C. We construct a corresponding high-level context C ↑ which does not directly access M's private locations and is such that M in C ↑ exhibits the same behavior as M ↓ does in C (possibly in a probabilistic sense). In the model where erroneous accesses are fatal, C ↑ M returns a given Boolean, for example, if, and only if, CM ↓ does (see Theorem 4.5). In the model where erroneous accesses are not fatal, one rather has that C ↑ M returns a given Boolean if, and only if, CM ↓ does with high probability, and then only with an assumption on the number of memory accesses being bounded (see Theorem 5.7).
Some of our results are phrased as full abstraction theorems for translations between the high-level language with locations and the lower-level language with natural-number addresses (Theorems 4.7 and 5.8). These theorems say, roughly, that two programs are equivalent in the high-level language if, and only if, their translations are equivalent (in a probabilistic sense) in the low-level language. (Computational soundness is the implication from the high-level equivalence to the low-level one.) The equivalences capture program indistinguishability in the presence of an arbitrary attacker, represented as the context of the programs: the attacker cannot, for example, force the two programs to yield different values (possibly in a probabilistic sense). As the examples presented in this section illustrate, the equivalences can express both secrecy and integrity properties. Therefore, the theorems imply the preservation of those secrecy and integrity properties.
The distinction of public and private locations, and the use of equivalences, are similar to those in information-flow security. There, equivalences generally relate two versions of the same program with different inputs (e.g., Denning [1982] and Volpano et al. [1996] ). Furthermore, preservation results are generally restricted to equivalences that can be established using particular logics or type systems (see, e.g., Abadi [1999, Section 7] and Medel [2006] , Barthe et al. [2007] , and Fournet and Rezk [2008] ). Like Fournet et al. [2009] , we do not make such restrictions: our equivalences may relate programs that differ in more than their inputs, and they need not be proved with any particular method.
Consider the following simple programs M and M of the high-level language:
where l is a private location and c and c are two distinct natural-number constants.
Here and in other examples, we omit the subscript loc on memory operations, for brevity. These programs have type unit (the type conventionally used in functional programming for commands). They can be distinguished by the context λg : unit.(g; !l = if c then true else false) but they are equivalent with respect to contexts that cannot access private locations. This property captures a secrecy guarantee. Similarly, if l is a public location, the following programs M and M :
can be distinguished by the context
nat. l := c ); if !l = c then true else false)
but they are equivalent with respect to contexts that cannot access private locations, because the argument f (supplied by the context) cannot tamper with l. This property captures an integrity guarantee. In an implementation in which l is housed in a random address in data memory, an attacker should find it hard to read or write the contents of l, so the secrecy and integrity guarantees should be preserved. As we see below, this is indeed the case.
Such a result may seem obvious. However, as we discuss, some other "equally obvious" results do not hold, and some variants and extensions appear problematic. We illustrate this point with the following small example. Writing for a chosen nonterminating program and * for the value of type unit, we consider the programs:
The implementations of M and M can be distinguished by a context that passes a function f that always produces a fatal error. Such a function can easily be expressed in the model where erroneous accesses are fatal. On the other hand, M and M will be equivalent in the high-level language unless this language too includes constructs that force immediate termination. Therefore, full abstraction fails without such constructs. Although of mostly theoretical interest, this small example is reminiscent of some actual attacks in which the distinction between error and nontermination leaks important information [Sovarel et al. 2005] .
Thus, our work demonstrates that layout randomization can offer some delicate but strong guarantees. Layout randomization is not just an ad hoc mitigation, or "security by obscurity". Nevertheless, our results have substantial limitations. They provide an incomplete account of software protection, ignoring most of the complications of practical implementations.
Many of the limitations directly correspond to limitations of the languages that we consider. For instance, these languages do not include the storage of functions in the heap, which our results do not treat; so we do not study whether an attacker can call a piece of code by guessing where in memory it resides, as in "jump-to-libc" attacks [Erlingsson 2007] .
Another limitation of our results is that they do not all apply to programs that receive or send locations-although they do apply to higher-order programs that receive or send functions for manipulating locations. We deliberately define our languages with locations as first-class values of a type loc. While this generality leads to an extra hypothesis in some of our theorems, it also enables us to discuss the difficulties that arise with locations as first-class values:
-Suppose that we allow loc to occur in contravariant positions in the types of the programs that we are protecting (that is, we allow loc to occur within an odd number of left-hand sides of function-space arrows, as in, for example, loc → unit and ((loc → unit) → unit) → unit). In the implementations of those programs, locations correspond to natural numbers, but in general this correspondence is not surjective. So a low-level attacker may attempt to poison the programs by providing a number that does not represent a location instead of one that does represent a location, and might gain information from the resulting errors. Consider for instance the programs:
which both have type loc → unit. While a high-level attacker cannot distinguish these two programs, a low-level attacker may attempt to distinguish them, with high probability, by passing a number that does not represent a public location: the naive implementation of M will diverge, that of M will produce an error. Such examples might be addressed by an implementation strategy in which incoming numbers that should represent locations are tested. These tests are reminiscent of how pointers are treated with suspicion when they cross trust boundaries in operating systems and other software systems.
-Suppose that we allow loc to occur in covariant positions in the types of the programs that we are protecting (i.e., we allow loc to occur within an even number of left-hand sides of function-space arrows, as in, e.g., loc and (loc → unit) → unit). Then a low-level attacker may store the numbers that represent the locations that it receives, and use them later, while analogous storage is not possible for a highlevel attacker-simply because locations cannot hold locations in our high-level model. Letting l 1 and l 2 be private locations, consider for instance the programs:
which both have type (loc → unit) → unit. They differ only in whether they store 0 or 1 in l 1 . Both of these leak l 1 to an argument function f , then set l 1 . They do the leaking at most once: this linearity is enforced by the flag l 2 . A low-level context can store the number that represents l 1 , then use it for reading what is stored in l 1 , and thereby could distinguish the implementations of M and M if no additional precautions are taken. This counterexample is reminiscent of some that arise in the study of cryptographic protocols, most notably a counterexample to forward secrecy [Abadi 1998 ]. It could perhaps be addressed by some of the techniques developed in such contexts. Unfortunately, those techniques may not result in attractive, realistic implementation strategies for a programming language such as ours, or for its obvious extensions where locations can hold other locations. Such extensions can bring up further problems, which it would be interesting to investigate in future research.
The significance of this limitation remains open to debate. One could argue that programs should never receive or send locations: it is too hard to make this safe, and exchanging functions, or objects with public methods and private fields, provides more flexibility-assuming that an attacker cannot recover the locations in question from the concrete representations of functions and objects. (Such a guarantee might be provided statically by typing or dynamically, perhaps via capabilities.)
These arguments are particularly sensible in the context of implementations where attackers have information on the offsets between private locations (much as in Shacham et al. [2004] ). For instance, a practical implementation may well store several private locations near one another, in a randomly placed block of memory chosen for this purpose. Then, an attacker that learns where l 1 is housed may also be able to infer that l 2 is nearby. Such dependencies can weaken security.
TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
This section presents basic technical material on which both Sections 4 and 5 rely. It describes both high-and low-level memory models and the common components of the languages considered in this article.
Memory Models
We begin with a discussion of our memory models. We need two: an abstract one, for the high-level language, and a more concrete one, for the low-level language.
For the abstract model we assume a finite set Loc of locations, ranged over by l, and further assumed to be the disjoint union of two sets, PubLoc and PriLoc, of public and private locations. Stores, ranged over by s, are maps s : Loc −→ N, sending locations to natural numbers. For any store s, s(l) = n indicates that the contents of the location l in the store s is n. We write Store for the set of stores.
For the concrete model we take the memory as having addresses 0, . . . , c, for a given c ≥ 0, which we think of as logical or virtual addresses rather than physical addresses; we assume that |Loc| ≤ c + 1. Memories, ranged over by m, are maps m : {0, . . . , c} −→ N + 1, where 1 is the set { * }, + is disjoint union. as atomic entities that all occupy the same space. With a little more effort we could use an alternative model where words are stored and arithmetic operations can be performed on them.
Memory layouts, ranged over by w, are 1-1 maps w : Loc → {0, . . . , c}. They are used to connect the abstract and concrete memory models. Note that, whereas there are infinitely many stores and memories, there are only a finite number of memory layouts. We consider only those memory layouts extending a given public layout w p : PubLoc → {0, . . . , c} that is fixed throughout.
For any store s and a memory layout w, there is a corresponding memory mem(s, w) defined by:
where Ran(w) is the range of w. Note that the map s → mem(s, w) is 1-1, but not onto; we say that m has the form mem(s, w) if it equals mem(s, w) for some w. We abbreviate mem(s, w) to s w . In order to make probabilistic assertions, we need a probability distribution d over the layouts extending w p . We mainly consider the uniform probability distribution U, which can be generated by fixing an ordering of Loc and then selecting, one-by-one, a non-repeating sequence of elements randomly from {0, . . . , c} \ Ran(w p ), choosing uniformly at each point from the remaining elements. When ϕ(w) is a statement, we write P d (ϕ(w)) for the probability that it holds with respect to the distribution d.
For any A ⊆ N, we define w#A to mean that A ∩ (Ran(w)\Ran(w p )) = ∅. Thinking of A as a set of attempted memory probes, allowing probes out of memory bounds and at addresses of public locations, w#A holds precisely when none of these probes hits private memory, that is, an address of a private location. P d (w#A) is then the probability that no probe in A hits private memory, using the above convention on probabilistic statements with free variable w. We define:
for n ≤ c + 1 − |PubLoc| (and δ d (n) is undefined otherwise). This number will be used to give our security guarantees. Note that δ d (0) = 1 and that if δ d (n) > 0 then n ≤ c + 1 − |Loc|, although the converse may fail.
In the case of the uniform distribution, P U (w#A) depends only on the cardinality of A, if A ⊆ {0, . . . , c} \ Ran(w p ), so we have δ U (n) = P U (w#A), for any such A with |A| = n. Note that δ U (n) > 0 if, and only if, n ≤ c + 1 − |Loc|.
We can give δ U (n) by:
where A is any subset of {0, . . . , c} \ Ran(w p ) of size n; it does not matter which such subset is chosen. That is, δ U (n) is the fraction of all memory layouts that extend w p but do not meet any of a fixed choice of n non-public memory addresses. The formula can be written in terms of binomial coefficients, by:
Thus, δ U (n) tends to 1 as c increases while PriLoc and PubLoc remain fixed. Intuitively, this fact means that, if one looks for private locations in a large enough memory, getting n tries, one is almost certain to miss if the memory is large enough.
As is shown by the following calculation, the uniform distribution U is optimal in the sense that δ U ≥ δ d for any probability distribution d; that is, U maximizes δ d . The second step of the calculation uses the fact that the minimum of a nonempty finite multiset of real numbers is less than, or equal to, their average.
Nonuniform distributions may still be helpful in practice. For example, one may wish to restrict randomization to part of the memory, or to restrict layouts (e.g., mapping some locations into a special memory region), and it may be possible to obtain sufficient security guarantees under such restrictions.
Our results hold for any probability distribution d. For the rest of the article, we fix a choice of d, and write P(ϕ(w)) and δ n for P d (ϕ(w)) and δ d (n), respectively.
Languages
A number of quite similar languages are considered in this article. They are all versions of Moggi's (call-by-value) computational λ-calculus, or λ c -calculus, Moggi [1989 Moggi [ , 1991 with natural number and, possibly, location types, and with memory-access operations at natural-number or location types. They all also have sum types, which represent disjoint or discriminated unions [Mitchell 1996 ], and recursion [Hasegawa and Kakutani 2002] . For general background on the λ-calculus, see Mitchell [1996] and Pierce [2002] . The types of such a language are given by:
where b ranges over a given set of basic types that always includes a natural-number type nat and may also include a location type loc. We write bool to abbreviate unit + unit.
The terms of such a language are ranged over by M and N, and given by:
where c ranges over a given set of constants c of a given type σ , written c : σ . These always include the natural numbers n ∈ N, together with constants for the usual arithmetic operations and relations, such as addition + : nat × nat → nat and equality = nat : nat × nat → bool. They may also include constants for memory access, for example :
There are standard notions of free and bound variables, of closed terms, and of the capture-avoiding substitution M[N/x] of a term N for all free occurrences of a variable x in a term M. There are standard typing rules for judgments M : σ , that a term M has type σ in the context , where contexts have the form = x 1 : σ 1 , . . . , x n : σ n . Here are two examples.
We write M : σ for M : σ , and read it as "M (is) of type σ "; one can think of σ as the interface of the term M. If M : σ then we say that M is well-typed (and it is necessarily closed). Unique typing holds: a term has at most one type relative to a given environment.
We may omit type subscripts when that should not cause confusion, for example, we write inl M instead of inl σ,τ M; we also write let x : σ be M in N for (λx : σ. N)M. We adopt standard infix notations, for example, writing M := N for := (M, N), if that improves readability. For the Booleans, we write true and false for inl * and inr * , respectively, and the conditional expression if B then M else N abbreviates cases B inl x : unit. M inr x : unit. N, where x occurs free in neither M nor N. To make the usual connection between applicative and imperative programs, we may write com (which stands for "command") for unit, skip for * , and M; N for let x : unit be M in N (where x is not free in N).
Throughout this article, we define the operational semantics of such a language in the style of Felleisen and Friedman [1986] , beginning by defining values V, evaluation contexts E, and redexes R. We classify each constant as a value or a redex; in particular the numerals and the constants for the assumed arithmetic operations and relations are always values; the error-raising constants of the high-level language of Section 4.1 are examples of constants which are not values. Values are terms which can be thought of as (syntax for) completed computations; they are ranged over by V and defined by:
Evaluation contexts are ranged over by E and are defined by:
We write E [M] for the term obtained by replacing the "hole" [−] in an evaluation context E by a term M. The computational thought behind evaluation contexts is that, in a term of the form E [M] , the first computational step arises within M. The redexes R include:
together with specified other redexes involving the various constants, including evident arithmetic redexes for the assumed arithmetic operations and relations, for example i + j and i = nat j. For every well-typed term M, exactly one of the following possibilities holds:
-M is a value, or -M can be analyzed uniquely in the form E [R] , with R a well-typed redex.
However, this has to be verified separately for each language. The operational semantics itself involves various relations and properties, and there is quite a bit of variation between the different languages. In all cases, however, a relation R −→ M between the above redexes and terms proves useful. It is defined as follows:
where the ellipses indicate evident missing arithmetic redex transitions, such as:
where k is the sum of i and j.
THE FATAL-ERROR MODEL
As explained in Section 2, our results compare the security properties implied by the semantics of high-level languages with those obtained from layout randomization in low-level languages. In this section, relying on the general framework of Section 3, we define a particular high-level language and a particular low-level language, then we develop the corresponding comparison. Specifically, we consider a low-level model in which an erroneous memory access gives rise to a fatal error (i.e., an irrecoverable error). A corresponding construct to raise such errors is needed at high-level, as discussed in Section 2. Section 4.1 presents the high-level language; since it has an error-raising construction, its operational semantics has an error predicate, as well as the usual transition relation. Section 4.2 presents the low-level language; its operational semantics additionally has an error predicate which is labeled by a natural number; this instrumentation is used in proofs and is not regarded as part of program behavior.
To mediate between the two languages, an instrumented high-level language, extending the high-level language, is given in Section 4.3. This language has facilities for memory access at both location and natural-number types, with non-public natural-number accesses always raising an instrumented error. We have a behaviorpreserving translation to the high-level language and a translation to the low-level language which is additionally sensitive to the instrumentation.
With these tools, we present our main results for the fatal-error model in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, to the effect that high-and low-level attackers have essentially equal power, modulo the translation from the high-level to the low-level language, and that this translation preserves and reflects suitable notions of contextual equivalence.
The High-Level Language
The high-level language employs the abstract notion of location. The basic types are nat and loc. The constants are the arithmetic constants, together with error-raising constants:
and constants for accessing and updating locations (which do not raise errors):
Of these, the arithmetic constants and the constants for accesses and updating locations are values, and the error-raising constant is a redex. As well as the redexes specified by the general framework, there are the following two kinds:
For the semantics of the high-level language, we define a configuration to be a pair (s, M) with s a store and M a well-typed term. The semantics then consists of a transition relation and an error property:
The transition relation and the error property are obtained from the special case of redexes by two rules:
For redexes, we take the transitions to be given by:
and a rule:
The error property is given by:
The operational semantics is "small-step"; one can define a corresponding "big-step" semantics by:
Note that these relations and properties are mutually exclusive. 
The Low-Level Language
In the low-level language, all memory accesses are made via natural numbers. Consequently we take the only basic type to be nat. (A possible variant would be to have a separate memory-address type.) As well as the arithmetic constants, the low-level language has error-raising constants:
raise error σ (for every σ ) and memory-access constants:
Note that loc cannot occur in σ in raise error σ as it is not a low-level type, and also that there are constants l nat for all the locations, not just the public ones. We say that a term is public if every l nat that occurs in it has l ∈ PubLoc. We take ! nat and := nat to be values, and raise error σ and l nat (with l ∈ Loc) to be redexes. The other redexes are those specified by the general framework, together with:
Configurations in the low-level operational semantics are pairs (m, M) of a memory m and a well-typed term M. The semantics is defined relative to a choice of a memory layout: this memory layout is needed to interpret the location constants l nat , which here function as names for addresses. It consists of a transition relation and two error properties, all relative to the memory layout chosen:
error . These are obtained from the special case of redexes much as described before:
.
For the redexes, the transitions and error properties are given by the rule:
together with:
and:
The low-level big-step operational semantics is defined by:
As is the case at the high-level, these relations and properties are mutually exclusive. Note that, if w |= (m, M) ↓ a error or w |= (m, M) ⇓ a error , and m has the form s w , then a / ∈ Ran(w p ).
The Instrumented High-Level Language
In order to relate the high-level semantics uniformly to the low-level language, we instrument it by adding some constants for accessing the store at type nat; in the final analysis, these will be translated away. Thus, the instrumented high-level language serves as a stepping stone, with semantics that resembles that of the high-level language but with a syntax that includes low-level constructs. The instrumented high-level language has the same basic types as the high-level language and its constants are those of the high-level language together with:
We take l nat to be a redex (for l ∈ PubLoc), and ! nat and := nat to be values, and classify the other constants as in the case of the high-level language. The other redexes are those specified by the general framework, together with the following ones:
the latter two kinds being inherited from the high-level language. For the operational semantics, configurations are defined as for the high-level language, but we add an instrumented error property:
We then proceed as for the high-level language, adding a rule for the instrumented error property:
and instrumented error properties:
For the big-step semantics, one defines one more predicate:
error , then a / ∈ Ran(w p ). Note too that the operational semantics of the instrumented high-level language is conservative over that of the high-level language. For the small-step operational semantics, conservativity means that, for any high-level terms M and N, a transition (s, M) −→ (s , M ) holds in the high-level language if, and only if, it does in the instrumented high-level language, and similarly for properties (s, M) ↓ error . Conservativity then follows for the big-step operational semantics: for every high-level term M and value V, (s, M) =⇒ (s , V), (s, M) ⇓ error , or (s, M) ⇑ hold in the high-level language if, and only if, they do in the instrumented one. High-Level. Every term M : σ of the instrumented high-level language can be translated to a term M ↑ : σ of the high-level language. First, we need a function to convert addresses of public locations to the locations themselves. Let l (1) , . . . , l ( p) be a listing without repetitions of PubLoc, and set a i = def w p (l (i) ), for i = 1, p. Define the high-level term G : nat → loc to be:
Translating Instrumented High-Level to
else raise error loc with the evident understanding of the multiple conditional. Then the translation is given by replacing the additional constants of the instrumented high-level language as follows:
and leaving the other constants fixed. The idea of this translation is to raise an error whenever the low-level term makes a non-public memory access.
Define ( 
Translating Instrumented High-Level to Low-Level.
We translate types σ and terms M : σ of the instrumented high-level language to types σ ↓ and terms M ↓ : σ ↓ of the low-level language. For types, we replace all occurrences of loc by nat. For terms, we replace each occurrence of a type σ by one of σ ↓ , and translate the constants as follows:
taking the translation to act as l nat (l ∈ PubLoc), ! nat and := loc . The translation is correct with respect to the low-level semantics, in the sense, roughly, that M ↓ simulates M. However there is a small problem in that the translation of a location value is not a natural-number value but, rather, is a natural-number redex. For that reason a translation of a term of a given type, for example, l loc , can make a transition to a term not itself a translation of a term of that type.
In order to track this correspondence between high-level and low-level terms, we define a simulation relation M w N between terms of the instrumented high-level language and the low-level language, parameterized on a memory layout w. We take this relation to be the least relation between terms of the instrumented high-level language and the low-level language which includes:
and which is closed under the other language constructs, meaning that, for example: 
The third case is particularly important as it enables one to use the instrumented high-level language to track memory accesses in the low-level language largely independently of memory layout.
High-and Low-Level Attackers
We are now in a position to formulate our theorems for the fatal-error case. The general idea is to show that a program (taken to be a closed term) executed in the abstract memory model is equally secure if executed in the concrete one. In terms of our typed programming language, one desires that a high-level term M : σ is as secure as its low-level counterpart M ↓ : σ ↓ . It turns out that this holds if σ is loc-free, that is, if σ ↓ = σ ; of course this restriction refers only to the interface of M: locations can still be used internally, that is, subterms of M can have types with occurrences of loc. (Our security result does not hold more generally-see the discussion in Section 2.)
In this section, we study the relation between high-and low-level attackers, represented as contexts. In Section 4.5, we consider equivalences. Say that an instrumented high-level term (low-level term) is public if it contains no occurrence of any l loc (respectively l nat ) with l ∈ PriLoc. One desires that attackers gain no advantage by attacking at low-level rather than at high-level. They certainly lose none, as, for any public high-level term C : σ → bool, the low-level term C ↓ is of equal attacking power, as the following proposition establishes: PROPOSITION 4.3. Let M : σ be a high-level term and let C : σ → bool be a public high-level term. Then:
These exhaust all possibilities for the big-step semantics of CM.
We restate this proposition in terms of a convenient notion of evaluation function. For any store s and term M : σ of the instrumented high-level language, and so also of the high-level language, define their behavior Eval(M, s) by:
Here error is a token indicating the raising of an error (and is the divergent program chosen above).
Similarly, for any low-level term M : σ , memory m, and layout w define their behavior Eval w (M, m) by: 
for any store s and memory layout w.
For a converse, suppose now that C : σ → bool is a public low-level term (so, as above, σ is loc-free since low-level types do not contain loc). Then C is also a public instrumented high-level term, and we would like to show that the public high-level term C ↑ : σ → bool is an attacker of equal power. This will be true in a probabilistic sense: 
The probability bound δ 1 arises because a non-public low-level memory access is made independently of the layout. Using the evaluation function, we obtain a weaker but more memorable statement:
COROLLARY 4.6. Suppose that M : σ is a high-level term and C : σ → bool is a public low-level term. Then, for any store s, we have:
Note that both Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.6 follow from the special case of the uniform distribution.
Equivalences
There is a natural relation of public (contextual) operational (high-level) equivalence, refining the standard relation of operational equivalence. It is defined by setting, for any two high-level terms, M, N of type σ :
where the quantification over C ranges over public high-level terms, and where, for high-level terms M 0 , N 0 : bool, we define:
where x = p y holds if, and only if, either x and y have the forms (s, V) and (s , V ), and s PubLoc = s PubLoc and V = V , or else x = y = error, or else x = y = . (As usual, if f is a function and S is a set then f S is the restriction of f to S.) At low-level, for any low-level terms M 0 , N 0 : bool say that M 0 ∼ l, p N 0 holds if, and only if, for every store s at least one of the following three possibilities holds:
This relation is a partial equivalence. (Reflexivity fails, in general, as a low-level term containing a secret location constant can branch on the address of that location in the memory.) If δ 1 > 0, then the three possibilities are mutually exclusive; also, if the first of them holds, then s , s and V are uniquely determined. As may be expected, the relation is most restrictive in the case of the uniform distribution. Now we define public (contextual) operational (low-level) partial equivalence, by putting, for low-level terms M, N of type σ :
where the C are restricted to be public low-level terms. 
THE RECOVERABLE-ERROR MODEL
Much like Section 4, this section defines a high-level language and a low-level language, and relates the security properties implied by the semantics of the former to those obtained from layout randomization in the latter. Here, however, unlike in Section 4, erroneous low-level memory accesses give rise to recoverable errors, and a local recovery mechanism is available for handling such errors. Moreover, there are no high-level errors. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present the high-level language and the lowlevel language, respectively. As in Section 4, we employ an instrumented high-level language in order to mediate between these two languages. This language, defined in Section 5.3, has facilities for memory access at both location and natural-number types, with an instrumented operational semantics that records natural-number memory accesses. With these tools, we present our main results for the recoverable-error model in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, to the effect that high-and low-level attackers have essentially equal power, modulo the translation from the high-level to the low-level language, and that this translation preserves and reflects suitable notions of contextual public equivalence. Thus, our main results are analogous to those for the fatal-error model. However, the recoverable-error model requires a more delicate analysis of probabilities, and also upper bounds on numbers of memory accesses.
The High-Level Language
The high-level language employs the abstract notion of location. The basic types are nat and loc, and the constants are the arithmetic constants, together with constants for accessing and updating locations:
Note that, unlike in the fatal-error case, there is no constant for raising an error. All the constants are values, and as well as the redexes specified by the general framework, there are the following two:
We define a configuration to be a pair (s, M) with s a store and M a well-typed term. The semantics of the high-level language then consists of a transition relation: (s, M) −→ (s , M ) which is obtained from the special case of redexes:
For redexes we take the transitions to be given by:
and the rule:
The big-step semantics is defined by:
The relation and property are mutually exclusive.
The Low-Level Language
In the low-level language, all memory accesses are made via natural numbers, just as in the fatal-error case. Consequently, we take the only basic type to be nat. As well as the arithmetic constants, the low-level language has memory-access constants:
where, for any type σ , we write σ e for σ + unit. Note that there are constants for all the locations, not just the public ones. The type σ e is used to model recoverable errors by values of the form inr * : σ e , which we write as error. The cases mechanism for sum types makes it possible to write programs which can handle such errors. For instance, an attacker may run a program that explores a part of memory looking for an address that holds a natural number, such as the programs:
cases ! nat 0 inl x : nat. x inr y : unit. 57 and cases ! nat 0 inl x : nat. x inr y : unit. cases ! nat 1 inl z : nat. z inr u : unit. 57 which return the first natural number that they find in memory, and simply return the constant 57 in case of failure.
We take ! nat and := nat to be values, and l nat to be a redex, for each l ∈ Loc. The other redexes are those specified by the general framework, together with: 
The family of transition relations is used to keep track of erroneous memory accesses. These are obtained from the special case of redexes in the usual way:
For the redexes, we take the transition relations to be given by the rule:
Notice that when an erroneous access is made then a non-fatal error arises. For the low-level big-step semantics one needs to keep track of sets of erroneous memory accesses, not just single ones. Accordingly, for A ⊆ N, define
and sets A i ⊆ N, for i = 1, n, such that
A to hold if there is an infinite sequence:
The Instrumented High-Level Language
In order to relate the high-level semantics uniformly to the low-level language, we instrument it by adding some constants for accessing the store at type nat. In the instrumented high-level language, accesses to the natural-number addresses of private locations will simply result in errors. In contrast, these accesses may work in the low-level language.
The instrumented high-level language has the same basic types as the high-level language and its constants are those of the high-level language together with:
We take l nat to be a redex (for l ∈ PubLoc), and ! nat and := nat to be values, and classify the other constants as in the case of the high-level language. The other redexes are those of the general framework, together with the following ones:
the latter two kinds being inherited from the high-level language. For the operational semantics, configurations are defined as for the high-level language, but we add an instrumented transition relation:
We then proceed as for the high-level language, adding a rule for the instrumented transition relation:
For the big-step semantics one again needs to keep track of sets of non-public mem- 
Note that the small-step semantics of the instrumented high-level language is a conservative extension of that of the high-level language. That is, a transition (s, M) −→ (s , M ) holds in the high-level language if, and only if, it does in the instrumented high-level language. For the big-step semantics, we have, for any terms M, M of the high-level language: Translating Instrumented High-Level to High-Level. Every term M : σ of the instrumented high-level language can be translated to a term M ↑ : σ of the high-level language. First, as in the fatal-error case, we need a function to convert addresses of public locations to the locations themselves. Define the high-level term to be:
where we make use of the enumeration of PubLoc and the definition of the a i given in Section 4.3.1. The term G σ has as arguments a number x and two continuations; the first is used if x is the layout of a public location and the second otherwise. The translation replaces the additional constants as follows, leaving the others fixed:
The idea of the translation is to simulate non-public memory accesses by recoverable errors. It is correct in the following sense: PROPOSITION 5.1. Let M be a well-typed term of the instrumented high-level language. Then:
A small variation on this translation will also prove useful. For any a ∈ N define a translation M ↑ a by the following alternative replacement of the additional constants. 
and take the translation to act as the identity on the other constants, viz.: l nat (l ∈ PubLoc), ! nat and := loc . The translation is correct with respect to the low-level semantics, in the sense, roughly, that M ↓ simulates M. As before, we employ a simulation relation M w N between terms of the instrumented high-level language and terms of the low-level language, parameterized on a memory layout w.
We take this relation to be the least relation between terms of the instrumented high-level language and terms of the the low-level language which includes: The third case is particularly important as it enables one to find the memory access largely independently of the memory layout. In terms of big-step relations and properties, we have:
w N for well-typed terms M of the instrumented high-level language and N of the low-level language. Then:
High-and Low-Level Attackers
We are now in a position to formulate our theorems for the recoverable-error case. Much as in the fatal-error case, we wish to show that a high-level term M : σ is as secure as its low-level counterpart M ↓ : σ ↓ . This holds under the assumption that σ is loc-free, i.e., that σ ↓ = σ . (As in the fatal-error case, it does not hold more generally.) Say that an instrumented high-level term (low-level term) is public if it contains no occurrence of any l loc (respectively l nat ) with l ∈ PriLoc. We would again like to show that attackers gain no advantage by attacking at low-level rather than at high-level. As before, they certainly lose none since, for any public high-level term C : σ → bool, the low-level term C ↓ is of equal attacking power. The following proposition, which relates C and C ↓ , follows immediately from Proposition 5.4:
PROPOSITION 5.5. Let M : σ be a high-level term and let C : σ → bool be a public high-level term. Then:
These exhaust all the possibilities for the big-step semantics of CM.
As before, we restate this using evaluation functions. For any store s and term M : σ of the instrumented high-level language (and so also any term of the high-level language) define their behavior Eval(M, s) by:
Note that we forget the A, regarding that as part of the instrumentation rather than the actual behavior. However, it also proves useful to define Acc(M, s) to be A∩{0, . . . , c}
Acc(M, s) records the accesses made to nonpublic addresses.
Similarly, for any low-level term M : σ , memory m, and layout w define their behavior Eval w (M, m) by:
| measures the number of "relevant" memory accesses made by M, starting from m, meaning those erroneous accesses within memory bounds. Analogously to Proposition 4.4, Corollary 5.6 expresses that for any public high-level term C : σ → bool, the low-level term C ↓ is of equal attacking power, as stated above. We write x w to mean (s w , M) when x is (s, M) and when x is . COROLLARY 5.6. Let M : σ be a high-level term and let C : σ → bool be a public high-level term. Then:
for any s and w.
For a converse, suppose now that C : σ → bool is a public low-level term (so σ is loc-free). Then C is also a public instrumented high-level term of the same type, and we would like to show that the public high-level term C ↑ : σ → bool is an attacker of equal power. This will be true in a probabilistic sense.
The following theorem gives a lower bound on the probability that high-and low-level behaviour (for C ↑ M and CM ↓ , respectively) coincide, where the layout w is allowed to vary according to its distribution and the store s is arbitrary. The theorem requires an bound on the number b of erroneous accesses: without that an attacker Note that we quantify over memories that are layouts of stores, not all memories. This relation is a partial equivalence: symmetry is evident, and transitivity follows from the assumption that δ b +1 > 1/2, which ensures that the alternatives are mutually exclusive, and that, if the first alternative holds then s , s and V are uniquely determined. (Reflexivity fails, in general, for the same reason as in the fatal-error case.) As may be expected, the relation is most restrictive in the case of the uniform distribution. Now we define (low-level) public (contextual) operational partial equivalence, by setting, for any two low-level terms M, N of type σ :
where the contexts C are restricted to be public low-level terms.
The following theorem says, roughly, that two programs are publicly equivalent in the high-level language if, and only if, their translations are publicly in the low-level language, with the caveat that the low-level equivalence is probabilistic and conditioned on a bound b on the number of erroneous accesses. It would be interesting to look for stronger computational-soundness results. For example, one might consider changing ∼ b l, p so as not to conflate nontermination with too many erroneous accesses.
CONCLUSION
Given the abundance of disparate techniques for protection, it is useful to compare those techniques. Our results relate layout randomization to the static guarantees of the syntax of a high-level language in which the programs that represent attackers can neither mention private locations directly nor access them via natural-number addresses. Our work follows that of Pucella and Schneider [2006] , which related obfuscation and type systems. However, their theorems do not explicitly mention resource bounds or probabilities, and focus on integrity properties. These theorems basically pertain to the protection-by obfuscation or typing-of a program from a potentially dangerous input. We consider more general attackers, represented by arbitrary contexts, and also treat program equivalences, capturing not only integrity but also secrecy properties. Despite these substantial differences, we share their goal of understanding randomization in the context of programming languages and their implementations.
Going further, one could study layout randomization for richer languages. Those languages may include richer type systems, concurrency, and dynamic allocation, in particular. For instance, they may allow the passing of locations (see Section 2), much like security protocols pass communication channels and cryptographic keys. Thus, despite the differences mentioned in the introduction, methods currently being developed in the study of security protocols could also be helpful in the study of layout randomization.
In another direction, one could explore variants and extensions-for instance, with replication (e.g., Berger and Zorn [2006] )-as well as other forms of randomization. For instance, our methods seem to apply to techniques that rename opcodes randomly. It may well also be possible to treat data structures or objects. To treat a fixed collection of arrays of given lengths, for example, one might proceed along the following lines. The memory model would specify the usual contiguous array layouts, and there would then be an analogue of the uniform distribution which assigns equal probabilities to all layouts. One would add a type array for arrays and facilities for handling them to the high-level languages. The low-level languages would remain as they are, except with the addition of constants of type nat for the arrays. Finally, the translations from the high-level to the low-level languages would amount to the usual implementation of the array operations, translating array to nat. We conjecture that analogues of all the above results would go through, except that it is not clear whether the uniform array layout distribution is optimal.
In such further advances, it may be tempting to develop and analyze sophisticated implementations that yield the strongest possible guarantees. Again, the analogy with security protocols may prove helpful. Nevertheless, those implementations would be of only limited interest unless they correspond to methods that could plausibly be used in actual systems. For instance, in models where the attacker may corrupt all shared memory (not common in security protocols), it may be futile to consider protection approaches that rely on frequent, extensive memory checks. Such difficulties should however encourage the development of programming models and constructs for which security guarantees can be realistically obtained. A promising step in this direction is the identification of the memory locations that are critical to security and require protection [Pattabiraman et al. 2008] .
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